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1CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking during pre and post financial
crisis periods
Abstract
This study examines the impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk during both pre and
post-financial crisis periods. Our results suggest a negative relationship between CEO
bonuses and banks’ risk in the pre-financial crisis period. Similarly, restricted shares and
options granted to CEOs in the post-financial crisis period also appear to decrease banks’
risk. In contrast, we observe a positive influence of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) on banks’ risk. Our results also show that the length of time to maturity of
options influences banks’ risk-taking behavior. Our findings have useful implications for
formulating and regulating CEO compensation structure.
Key Words: Compensation ; risk-taking; financial crisis; TARP
21. Introduction
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and its impact on firms’ risk-taking has
become a critical issue in the banking and finance literature, especially during the recent
2007-2008 financial crisis that engulfed economies worldwide. Even though banks operate
in a regulated environment, they have opportunities to make their own decisions which
influence the riskiness of these institutions (e.g., John et al. 1995). Among these decisions,
setting up the level and structure of CEO compensation is a significant one that influences
not only the risk-taking behavior of CEOs, but also affect firms’ performance.
In the context of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), executive compensation is
viewed as an important tool in helping to overcome potential agency problems by aligning
the interests of the principals (shareholders) with those of the agents (CEOs). By contrast,
the managerial power theory considers executive compensation as an agency problem itself
(see e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). According to the managerial power theory, CEOs may
behave opportunistically by resorting to rent extraction through their compensation structure
at the expense of shareholders’ interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Sparked by the US sub-
prime crisis, banks have suffered from dramatic collapse in asset values and stock prices.
During mid to late 2002, large commercial banks shifted their focus from traditional banking
to more volatile investment banking, which relied on loan securitization (DeYoung et al.,
2010; Suntheim, 2010). Lack of sufficient understanding of risk by banks’ executives and
their failure to take appropriate measures to account for banks’ risk had led these managers
to oversights such as using short-term debt to finance long-term assets. In addition, the
compensation policies in the banking sector are increasingly being criticized for inducing too
much risk (see e.g., Turner 2009).
Although the level of compensation is not the same across firms, executive compensation
packages typically contain components such as a base salary, an annual bonus tied to
accounting performance, stock options, and long-term incentive plans (Murphy, 1999).
Among these components of executive compensation, bonuses are regarded as one of the
causes of the recent 2007-2008 financial crisis by many, including the US government.
Consequently, after the financial crisis, the US government initiated various reforms (such as
Troubled Assets Relief Program, TARP), intended to link compensation to long-run
performance, as it believed that short-term incentives create conflicts of interests between
3shareholders and executives.1 Restricted shares and stock options are typical examples of
compensation that are perceived to align the interests of executives with those of
shareholders.
The use of executive stock options by US firms experienced a dramatic rise during the past
few decades. The 2001 annual survey of executive pay by the Business Week estimates that
options account for 80% of total CEO pay (Tian, 2004). However, it is not clear whether this
common practice of executive compensation is in the best interests of shareholders.
Consistent with the managerial power hypothesis, Tian and Yang (2014), for instance,
provide evidence suggesting that powerful CEOs in US financial firms altered their
compensation structure for their own benefit rather than acting in the interests of
shareholders.2 In line with this, a number of authors indicate that compensation structure
have induced risk-taking behavior in the banking industry that largely contributed to the
2007-2008 financial crisis (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2010; Berndt et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011;
Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). In contrast, other studies (e.g.,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Hayes et al., 2012) report evidence suggesting that CEOs of
financial institutions were unaware of the financial crisis, as they appeared to have huge
investments in their own institutions even at the time of the financial crisis.3
As a consequence, this study aims to contribute to the relevant literature by exploring the
relationship between various components of CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking, for a
sample of US firms across both pre and post-financial crisis periods. In particular, we
examine whether bonuses granted to CEOs in the 2002-2008 period had a positive impact on
banks’ risk-taking; and whether increased focus on encouraging equity compensation in the
post-financial crisis period had any influence on aligning the interests between shareholders
and executives as expected. We focus on CEOs only because CEOs are responsible for the
firms’ operations and decisions, and CEO compensation is the most debatable issue among
various stakeholders of firms (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). It is also believed that the form
1 The ‘Troubled Asset Relief Program’ (TARP) was implemented by the US Treasury Department in 2008 to
buy assets from, and infuse equity, into financial institutions, and to help them bolster their financial health. In
order to obtain TARP funding from the government, banks have to comply with requirements set by TARP,
including for instance, certain restrictions on executive pay.
2 This is consistent with the ‘managerial incentives hypothesis’ posited by Bhagat and Bolton (2014), who
argue that the CEO incentive structure may have contributed to excessive risk-taking by banks that resulted in
benefiting the CEOs in the short run at the expense of long term shareholders’ return.
3 This notion is consistent with the ‘unforeseen risk hypothesis’ suggested by Bhagat and Bolton (2014).
4rather than the level of compensation is a significant incentive to CEOs (Mehran, 1995).
In addition, we extend our analysis by exploring the impact of outside regulation, such as
TARP on the compensation-banks’ risk-taking relationship. While some extant literature
(e.g., Belkhir and Chazi, 2010) suggests that regulation of compensation is indeed effective4,
other evidence suggests to the contrary. Houston and James (1995), for example, find that
attempts initiated by government to control executives’ short-term incentives in
compensation packages are ineffective. The effectiveness of regulation in reducing risk-
taking in general, and regulating compensation in particular, remains a controversial issue.
The existing literature (e.g., Cadman et al., 2012; Elyasiani et al., 2011) is limited to
studying the impact of TARP on banks’ risk-taking, and report contradictory findings.
Evidence on the effectiveness of TARP in regulating CEO compensation is, however, rather
scarce. As a consequence, we explore whether TARP induces equity-based compensation in
order to reduce banks’ risk.
Our study differs from prior studies in a number ways. Firstly, we explicitly examine the
impact of CEO compensation on several price-based risk-taking measures: total risk,
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Secondly, we use CEO compensation, including not
only stock options and restricted shares, but also bonuses which are often considered as one
of the causes of the recent financial crisis. It is argued that the effects of these various kinds
of compensation components are different. Bonus, for instance, is generally considered a
short-term incentive, while restricted shares and options are normally believed to be long-
term incentives. The influence of restricted shares and options are also different as the
former represent the current ownership and the latter represent future ownership. While
Chen et al. (2006) examine the relation between option-based compensation and various
measures of banks’ risks, we extend their work by including bonuses and restricted shares in
our analyses, which may also have played an important role in the recent financial crisis.
Thirdly, by examining the compensation-risk taking relationship across both pre and post-
financial crisis periods would help us better understand the implications of various
compensation reforms introduced after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Our study helps to
identify whether the increased emphasis on equity-based compensation has achieved the
4 For example, Bührer (2010) finds that short-term compensation is partly shifted to long-term compensation
when government regulation intends to reduce executives’ short-term incentives. Supporting this view, Belkhir
and Chazi (2010) suggest that regulation is effective in regulating CEO compensation and reducing excessive
risk taking by banks.
5desired effects, especially in the post-financial crisis period. Further, we perform additional
analyses to examine how outside regulation (TARP) influences the compensation and banks’
risk-taking relationship for a sub-sample of firms. This analysis helps us gain an insight into
whether the much highlighted initiative by the US government has been effective in
alleviating some of the moral hazard problems faced by the banking sector. Finally, in order
to conduct a detailed examination of the relation between options and risk-taking, we also
examine the time to maturity of options in order to explore whether the time to maturity of
options has an influence on banks’ risk-taking5.
Through the analysis of descriptive statistics and empirical results, several significant
conclusions emerge. Firstly, in the 2002-2008 period, bonuses awarded to CEOs appear to
reduce bank risk-taking, as measured by total risk and systematic risk, as well as
idiosyncratic risk. This is inconsistent with the argument that bonuses may have been one of
the causes of the recent financial crisis. Secondly, in the 2009-2013 period, both the
restricted shares and options granted to CEOs decreased banks’ risk. The intention of
compensation reforms is to link CEO pay to long-term performance that would result in the
alignment of interest of shareholders and executives. This result indicates that shares and
options granted will not lead to excessive risk.
Results from our additional analyses reveal that TARP significantly increased banks’ risk,
which runs counter to the original premise that TARP would result in reducing banks’
excessive risk-taking. This result may be explained by the fact that the restrictions in TARP
on executive pay adversely influence important employees’ retention, which is injurious to
banks and increases their risk-taking (Cadman et al., 2012). Similarly, we also observe that
options with time to maturity of more than four years strongly reduce banks’ risk-taking, and
there is no statistically significant evidence supporting the premise that options with less
than four years’ time to maturity reduce banks’ risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant literature on the
relationship between CEO compensation structure and banks’ risk. Section 3 develops the
research strategy including the hypotheses, data and methodology. Section 4 presents
descriptive statistics, and discusses empirical results. Section 5 summarizes the major
findings of our study.
5 While a number of studies provide evidence on the vesting period of options (e.g., Bhagat and Romano, 2009;
Peng and Roell, 2014), evidence on the characteristic of time to maturity of options has been rather limited.
62. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1 Compensation structure and risk-taking
We rely on the agency theory literature to make predictions about the association between
CEO incentives and banks’ risk-taking. According to the agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), CEOs are relatively more reluctant to take risks because CEOs have
limited opportunities to spread out their risks as compared to shareholders, who can easily
diversify their risks by holding diversified portfolios (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002).6
Therefore, in order to encourage CEOs to take on more risky projects that have potential for
growth and attracting higher returns in the future, shareholders compensate CEOs with
stocks and options that are intended to link the interests of CEOs with those of the
shareholders.
While the compensation structure is not the same across countries and sectors, compensation
packages incorporate a wide variety of elements, including salary, bonuses, and stock
holdings as well as a variety of stock option plans (Houston and James, 1995). The extent
and structure of executive compensation has implications for risk-taking and for the agency
relation between managers and shareholders, and it is in the interest of both regulators and
shareholders to monitor the executive compensation (Chen et al., 2006).
The recent 2007-2008 financial crisis had influenced the entire corporate sector, and had a
widespread adverse impact on the world economy as it unfolded. The banks’ executive
compensation is often blamed as the root cause of the financial crisis. Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011) indicate three versions of the poor incentives explanation of the crisis, including
CEOs’ focus on short-term profits at the expense of the long-term future of the firm; the role
of options in inducing excessive risk taking by banks; and CEOs’ actions to increase their
share value by increasing the volatility of assets because the shares are effectively options on
the value of those assets.7 The existing research has looked at the effects of compensation on
6 Risk-neutral shareholders would therefore like executives to accept all projects with positive net present value
(NPV) without considering the risk. However, unlike shareholders, executives are largely risk-averse and tend
to avoid private losses by investing in less risky projects with positive NPV. Consequently, some projects
which are under the consideration of shareholders may be refused. This creates the risk-related incentive
problem.
7 Bolton et al. (2010), for instance, indicate that CEO compensation which is designed to maximize shareholder
value in a levered firm will encourage excessive risk taking as the value of stock is increasing with the
volatility of the assets held by the firm. Therefore, it is in the interest of shareholders in leveraged firms to
reduce managers’ risk taking incentives in order to lower the cost of debt. However, even with this objective,
managers’ behavior will ultimately lead to risk shifting as their actions are unobservable.
7performance, but studies on the compensation and risk-taking of financial institutions are
rather limited, and the evidence is largely mixed and inconclusive.
While some studies support the view that the financial crisis was wholly unforeseen by
CEOs (see, e.g., Houston and James, 1995; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Hayers et al., 2012;
Bhagat and Bolton, 2014), others argue in support of the view that executives used
compensation packages to reduce their personal risks and gained substantial benefits, which
was not consonant with ensuring firms’ long-run profitability (see e.g., Core et al., 2003;
Lorn and Saito, 2012; Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Armstrong et al., 2013). Houston and
James (1995), for instance, indicate that compensation in the banking industry did not
promote risk-taking more than in other sectors. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2011),
however, suggest a close relationship between banks’ compensation and risk-taking. In
addition, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) conclude that banks with a better alignment of
interests between executives and shareholders performed worse than others in the financial
crisis. This is consistent with the perception that better aligned interest increased incentives
for firms to take more risk that may have led to the financial crisis (Hakenes and Schnable,
2014).
2.1 Bonus and banks’ risk-taking
Heavy reliance on bonuses has been one of the main features of compensation packages for
decades, and the majority of firms on Wall Street kept their fixed costs under control by
keeping base salaries low and paying most of the compensation in the form of bonuses that
varied with profitability (Murphy, 2009). Bonuses are paid on the basis of past short-term
performance and are awarded to executives only if accounting earnings exceed a threshold
set by the company. The rewards and penalties of bonuses are asymmetric as there are high
rewards for superior performance but no penalties are imposed for underperformance or
even failure. The criticism of such reward initiatives is that these payments do not take long-
term value creation into consideration. Accounting-based performance measures are
advantageous by being easily verifiable, and consequently managers can conveniently link
their actions to bonus payments. However, these measures can be manipulated and induce
less optimal decision making as they are based on past rather than future performance.
Therefore, measuring past performance is inherently subjective, and such plans will
necessarily involve discretionary payment based on the subjective assessment of
performance.
8The evidence on compensation-induced risk-taking is mixed. Some studies report no
evidence to support the claim in respect of the role of compensation in the financial crisis,
and argue that banks’ CEOs also faced heavy losses during the financial crisis (Fahlenbrach
and Stulz, 2011). On the other hand, several other studies indicate a positive relation
between bonuses and risk-taking (Deyong, Peng, and Yan, 2010; Cheng, Hong, and
Scheinkman, 2011). From the view that managers are sophisticated, while shareholders are
unsophisticated, bonuses provided are consistent with shareholder preferences. However,
Bannier et al. (2013) and Murphy (2009) conclude that incentives resulting from competition
for talent will induce executives to take excessive risk not only from the society’s
perspective but also from the viewpoint of the banks themselves. Accordingly, we test the
following hypothesis:
H1: Bonuses awarded to CEOs have a positive influence on banks’ risk.
2.2 Restricted shares and banks’ risk-taking
Restricted shares are granted when performance criteria are met, and are regarded as long-
term incentives over a horizon longer than one year (Suntheim, 2010). The influence of
restricted shares on mangers’ risk-taking behavior is complicated. Linking executive wealth
to the value of the firm’s stock is perceived to help reduce the conflict of interests between
executives and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Morck et al. 1988; Fahlenbrach and
Stulz, 2011).8 These shareholding executives may obtain benefit along with other
shareholders through shifting risks to debt holders, and these share incentives may motivate
executives to take on high risks (John and John, 1993). Compared with other incentives such
as options, there is no downside limit for shares. However, rewarding executives with
restricted shares links the payment to stock price movement, which may cause a decrease in
executives’ wealth. Therefore, undiversified executives who hold shares may be unwilling to
take on high risk/high return projects (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Therefore, it is predicted that
restricted shares awarded to CEOs are negatively related to banks’ risk. We therefore test the
following hypothesis:
H2: Restricted shares granted to CEOs have a negative influence on banks’ risk.
2.3 Options and banks’ risk-taking
Options are the rights granted to CEOs to buy shares at a pre-specified price. The typical
8 However, one can also argue that share-based compensation may give CEOs an incentive to manipulate share
prices, resulting in more risk-taking by banks; and therefore the agency problem remains unresolved.
9option contract has a maturity of 10 years, and these options granted to CEOs are regarded as
long-term incentives (Suntheim, 2010). Usually, the exercise of an option is conditional on
the achievement of pre-specified performance criteria. Awarding executives with common
stock and stock options will make a difference. With the increase of variance, the value of an
option calculated by the Black and Scholes model will go up, and consequently the value of
an executive’s common stock and stock option will also increase.
Similarly, if executives hold large amounts of common stocks and options, the increase in
option value will dominate, and they will have the incentive to accept high-risk projects with
high returns. In addition, unlike shares which have unlimited downside risk moving along
with share price movement, stock options restrict this downside risk exposure, which should
encourage risky investment. Option awards make risk more acceptable to executives and
help to mitigate risk-aversion problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Smith and Stulz 1985).
However, this risk-shifting incentive will increase agency problems between debt-holders
and shareholders which, in turn, reduce managers’ risk-shifting behavior in the presence of
executive stock options (Agrawal and Mandelker 1987). Therefore, it is not clear whether
the option granted to executives will provide them with an incentive to increase risk.
There are numerous studies that examine the influence of stock options on risk-taking. The
evidence, however, is largely mixed and inconclusive. Whereas some studies indicate that
stock options create incentives to reduce firms’ risk (e.g., Lambert et al. 1991, Carpenter
2000, and Tian 2004, Hayers et al., 2012), others report a positive relation between option
incentives and risk taking (such as, Agrawal and Mandelker 1987, Defusco et al. 1990,
William and Rao 2000, and Chen et al. 2006). Hayers et al., (2012), for instance, show that
there is no positive relationship between the convexity in options and a firm’s excessive risk-
taking, which suggests that the use of options in remuneration packages did not contribute to
the financial crisis. Lambert et al. (1991), however, criticizes the accuracy of market-based
valuation formulas. These formulas are based on the risks that shareholders can diversify and
therefore only undiversified risk is considered. However, due to the differential
diversification ability between executives and shareholders, beside the systematic risk,
executives also face idiosyncratic risk, which is not priced.
In this regard, Armstrong and Vashishtha (2013) find that stock options create an incentive
to reduce idiosyncratic risk. Tian (2004) also indicates a positive relation between options
granted and systematic risk, and argues that the increase in systematic risk will increase the
expected return of the firm. The combined risk incentive is the result of the relative strength
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and interaction between the effects of systematic and idiosyncratic risk. However, it is
critical to note that option incentive will not always induce risk-taking. Firstly, as the CEO
has to bear the extra idiosyncratic risk, the value of options to CEOs is not equal to the cost
calculated by shareholders (see e.g., Lambert et al. 1991). Secondly, a risk-averse CEO may
value a stock option at a discount, which is positively correlated with his degree of risk
aversion and the stock return volatility (e.g., Hall and Murphy 2000, Ingersoll 2000, and
Tian 2004). Thirdly, the CEO is assumed to be in a constant absolute risk-averse utility
function, and therefore giving him more options increases the volatility of his personal
portfolio. Consequently, the CEO tends to offset this increased volatility by reducing the
volatility of the underlying asset portfolio (see e.g., Carpenter 2000). Finally, it is argued
that the intention to increase stock price is only feasible when the options wealth does not
exceed a certain proportion of total wealth (e.g., Tian 2004). Beyond this limit, more options
will result in reducing incentive effects. In addition, stock options also increase the incentive
to reduce idiosyncratic risk and increase systematic risk.
Therefore, the risk-taking hypothesis is as follows:
H3a: CEO’s stock option-based compensation has a positive influence on banks’ risk.
The risk aversion hypothesis is as follows:
H3b: CEO’s stock option-based compensation has a negative influence on banks’ risk.
2.4 Effectiveness of TARP
In response to the severe 2007-2008 financial crisis, various capital assistance programs
were introduced by governments around the world. The ‘Troubled Asset Relief Program’
(TARP) is a famous one, which was implemented by the US Treasury Department in 2008 to
buy assets from, and infuse equity into, financial institutions to help them strengthen their
financial health. In order to obtain TARP funding from the government, banks have to
comply with requirements set by TARP. One of these rules is about restriction on executive
pay. Although there is some evidence of the impact of TARP on banks’ risk, there is
relatively little evidence of whether TARP is effective in regulating CEO compensation. The
majority of the existing literature on the impact of TARP on banks’ risk-taking provides
contradictory evidence on the effectiveness of TARP (e.g., Cadman et al., 2012; Elyasiani et
al., 2011). Cadman et al. (2012), for instance, suggest that the implementation of TARP does
not reduce excessive risk-taking by banks, but instead encourages executives’ incentive to
11
increase risk. Harris et al. (2013) also argue that capital injections under TARP induced
moral hazard behavior that resulted in the reduction of operating efficiency of the bailed out
institutions. Similarly, Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) find that when firms accept bailouts from
the government, outside investors may believe that these firms are in severe credit default.
From this perspective, the funding from TARP is a bad signal to investors and this will
reduce market confidence and increase firms’ risk. Using an event study methodology,
Farruggio et al. (2013), find that capital injections under TARP may have decreased
investors’ confidence and increased banks’ risk. Based on the TARP documentation,
supported banks are required to follow TARP restrictions that impose limits on executive
compensation. Therefore, the executive remuneration, which is thought to have been a driver
of the financial crisis, will be reconstructed to help promote banks’ financial stability. As a
result, it is reasonably anticipated that TARP is designed and subsequently implemented to
effectively regulate CEO equity-based compensation. Thus, the following two hypotheses
are proposed:
H4a: TARP has a negative impact on volatility of banks’ stock returns.
H4b: TARP induced equity-based CEO’s compensation has a negative impact on volatility of
banks’ stock returns.
2.5 Length of time to maturity of options
Characteristics of options, like vesting period and time to maturity, are important elements
that need to be considered when building a CEO compensation package. However, previous
research has often focused on the vesting period of options only (e.g., Bolton et al., 2006;
Bhagat and Romano, 2009; Chen et al., 2011; Peng and Roell, 2014), with the characteristic
of time to maturity of options being relatively ignored.
In order to help regulators draw up further effective regulations on CEO compensation, the
time to maturity of options is examined in this study and it is expected that the shorter the
time to the maturity of options, the greater the risk-taking by banks. The reason supporting
this argument is that executives often have different interests to those of shareholders (John
and Qian, 2003), even though options are assumed to help align their interests, for executives
still have incentives to benefit themselves at the expense of long-term firm performance.
Therefore, if options are to be exercised in the short term, it is anticipated that executives
will have incentives to manipulate share prices, which may lead to higher risk-taking by
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banks. Additionally, in order to simplify the analysis, this study makes an assumption that
CEOs are not allowed to exercise their options until the expiration date. As a consequence,
the hypothesis formulated is as follows:
H5a: Options with a short time to maturity increase banks’ volatility of stock return.
H5b: Options with a long time to maturity reduce banks’ volatility of stock return.
Overall, the review of relevant literature indicates that the bulk of the existing studies focus
on the period before and during the crisis, without considering the post-financial crisis
period. Similarly, it is also evident that there is limited evidence on directly examining the
impact of regulation, such as TARP, on the compensation-risk taking relationship. As a
consequence, the focus of the current study is to disentangle the impact of different
components of executive compensation on various components of banks’ risk, and also shed
some light on the impact of outside regulation on the compensation-risk relationship.
3. Research strategy
3.1 Methodology and data
We begin with a sample period encompassing both pre-financial crisis period of 2002-2008,
and post-financial crisis period of 2009-2013. Compensation data is obtained from Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) Execucomp. Following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), the Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6300 are adopted. Firms with SIC
code 6282 (Investment Advice) are excluded as they are not in the lending business. In
addition, firms with SIC code 6199 (Finance Services) and SIC code 6211 (Security Brokers
and Dealers) are searched manually and excluded.
As a consequence, the sample consists of firms that have compensation information
available from Execucomp with at least three years of data available during the sample
period. The accounting data is obtained from Compustat, while the stock return data is taken
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The pooled sample contains 287
firm-year observations for the period 2002-2008, and 389 firm-year observations for the
period 2009-2013.
For the subsequent analysis we use a sub-sample of 345 firm-year observations between
2008 and 2013 to examine the impact of TARP. When selecting banks for the sample period,
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we use the TARP bailout list from the ProPublica website9. This list helps us to identify the
banks receiving funding from TARP. When identifying and selecting banks which did not
accept TARP funding, we follow Bhagat and Bolton (2014). Using volatility of stock return
as a measure of banks’ risk, we employ a dummy variable equal to 1 when a bank accepted
TARP and zero otherwise. In total we classify 58 observations as TARP banks and 23 NO-
TARP banks. Additionally, following Kini and Williams (2012), previous year’s
compensation data from 2007- 2012 is used for the period 2008-2013.
3.2 Empirical model
Our study analyzes the effects of CEO compensation structure on banks’ risk-taking. The
primary model examines the relation between executive compensation structure and risk-
taking by modelling three market-based risk measures as a function of compensation
structure and a set of control variables based on the existing literature.10
The primary model is specified as:
        =   [           ,             ℎ    ,             ,     (     ),                         ,                     ,         _          ]
(1)
Where
  _        	 ∈ {          
          _         ,                     	  ℎ                 _        ,                        _        }
        ∈ {     ,     ,       }
Where, Risk represents one of the three alternative measures of risk generated from the two-
index model.     is the total risk,     is the systematic risk, and       is the idiosyncratic risk.
P_comp consists of three main categories of compensation including proportion of bonus
(P_bonus), restricted shares (P_RS), and options (P_option) granted to CEOs, as a
proportion of CEO’s total compensation. In addition, Ownership, Tenure, LnTA (the natural
logarithm of the total assets), Capital_Ratio (the equity-to-asset ratio), Investment (the
9 The bailout list is from: http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list
10 Compensation may also be endogenously determined. It is debated in the extant literature that CEO of a
more risky bank may prefer salary-based compensation because the equity-based compensation would be
decreased under high volatility. However, others argue that higher risk serves as a measure of a firm’s
information asymmetry, and this opportunity can be maximized through equity-based compensation (Chen et
al., 2006). Whereas, Garen (1994) finds none of his regression models substantiate this relation. Our research
partly mitigates this concern by using one year lagged values of the independent variables, and including firm
fixed effects. Our results suggest that causation runs from our independent variables to risk- taking.
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market-to-book ratio) are included as control variables. Yearly dummy variables are also
included to control for year effects.
Proxy for risk
The risk measures are obtained from the two-index market model and are estimated for each
year using daily data for the relevant year obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database (Saunders et al., 1990; Chen et al, 2006). The estimated model is:
    =   +       (     ) +       (   ) +     (2)
Where,     is the bank’s stock daily return;     is the daily return on the CRSP equally-
weighted index; I is the daily three-month T-bill yield obtained from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis; and     is a random error term.
The estimation of equation 2 results in systematic risk measurement,       . The total risk and
idiosyncratic risk are obtained by calculating the standard deviation of the stock return and
residuals. Our approach is fundamentally different from previous studies on the relationship
between CEO compensation and risk-taking, most of which focus on total risk, rather than
decomposing risk into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk so as to examine their individual
distinctive features. As total risk is the result of the relative strength and interaction between
the effects of systematic and idiosyncratic risk, decomposing total risk is helpful to identify
the exact impact of compensation structure on risk.
Proxy for compensation structure
Recent literature has used both the absolute value of compensation components and the
weights of each component in total compensation as proxies for CEO compensation
structure (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 2012; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). In our
study, we adopt the latter format because the weights would give full account of the
contribution of each individual component of compensation. P_bonus is the weight of bonus
in total compensation, which is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, options and restricted
stock. P_option is the fraction of total compensation related to CEOs’ outstanding options.
The total value of options for each fiscal year is calculated using the modified Black-Scholes
model and is the sum value of exercisable and unexercisable outstanding options.
Furthermore, we also include restricted shares (P_RS) owned by CEOs in our model. In this
regard, Bhagat and Romano (2009) provide evidence suggesting that utilising restricted
stocks reduce firms’ risk taking. In respect of CEOs’ salaries, this study does not examine it
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separately due to the fact that it is always fixed in the compensation agreement. Instead,
salary has been taken into account as a part of total compensation. A positive and significant
coefficient on P_comp would support the risk-taking hypothesis. Conversely, a negative and
significant coefficient would support the risk-aversion hypothesis.
Control variables
Following prior literature, we also control for CEO characteristics, CEO tenure and
ownership, as well as for firm specific factors such as bank size, financial leverage and
investment opportunity. A dummy variable is also included to control for year effects.
Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has spent in office. As the 1-year lagged tenure is
used in our study, the basic assumption is that the CEO is the same person as the previous
year. The expertise hypothesis suggests that a longer tenure is associated with greater
experience and managerial skill (Vafeas, 2003). Therefore, CEOs with long-term
engagement are more likely to be willing to undertake high risks as they are confident about
their skills to generate high returns from these high risk projects. It is therefore argued that
the duration of tenure is positively related to risk (see e.g., Bugeja et al., 2012). However, an
entrenched CEO is likely to extract more private benefits from his firm (Belkhir and Chazi,
2010), and therefore the CEO with longer tenure becomes more risk-averse. In addition, a
long-term engaged CEO cares more about his reputation. Therefore, the relationship between
CEO tenure and risk may be predicted to be negative (see e.g., Armstrong and Vashishtha,
2012). It is therefore difficult to make an unambiguous prediction about the relation between
CEO tenure and risk.
CEO Ownership percentage is the common shares owned by the CEO divided by the total
number of common shares outstanding. If this percentage is more than 1%, CEO ownership
is equal to 1; otherwise, it is equal to 0. By increasing CEO’s stock ownership in the firm,
the risk taking incentives become more closely aligned to those of shareholders, and
therefore CEO stock ownership is predicted to be positively associated with risk taking.
However, Saunders et al. (1990) argued that this relationship only exists when the shares
owned by the CEO are not as large a proportion of their personal wealth, as this will make
them overly concerned with the idiosyncratic risk of the bank. In addition, if the executives
own a significant number of the firm’s shares, they are expected to hedge more as their
compensation is a linear function of the value of the firm (Smith and Stulz, 1985).
Consequently, these undiversified executives have an incentive to reduce the variance of the
firm’s returns. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the relationship without considering the
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percentage of common shares owned to the CEO’s total wealth.
LnTA is measured as the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets, representing the bank’s
size. Belkhir and Chazi (2010) argue that a more diffuse ownership is created when banks
become large, and the shareholders are not capable of monitoring executives’ behavior. As a
result, managers are perceived to act in their own interests and reduce the variability of the
bank’s returns. In addition, as large banks own multiple product lines, they are more
diversified and less risky compared to smaller banks (Chen et al., 2006). Therefore, it is
expected that a bank’s size will be negatively correlated with bank risk. However, it is also
debated that as larger banks have a greater capacity to assume more risk, a positive
association is expected (Belkhir and Chazi, 2010). Therefore, it is not possible to predict the
sign of the relationship between bank’s size and risk.
Capital_Ratio is equity divided by total asset. From the traditional view, it is believed that
the larger equity finance, the lower is a bank’s risk. This is because higher equity finance
will reduce default risk and debt cost (Chen et al., 2006). Therefore, it is predicted that
Capital_Ratio is negatively correlated with a bank’s risk.
MB (the market-to-book ratio) is the measure of investment opportunities. Firms with more
growth opportunities generate value from future investments rather than from existing assets
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). Therefore, it is predicted that investment opportunities are
positively associated with risk.
In addition to estimating the primary model (1), we further extend our analysis to explore
whether TARP is effective in reducing banks’ risk taking and regulating CEO equity-based
compensation packages from 2008 to 2013. As a consequence, we estimate the following
model:
Risk Measure t =   0 +   1 P_bonus t-1 +   2 P_equity t-1 +   3 CEO tenure t +
																								  4 M/B ratio t +	  5 TARPt +	  6 TARP*P_equity t +  7 ROA t-1 +
  8 Asset t +   9 Ownership t +	  10 Year +   t (3)
Following extant literature (e.g., Laevena and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Bugeja et
al., 2012), volatility of stock returns is used as the dependent variable in model (3). Volatility
of stock returns describes the market performance of banks, which is a less noisy measure
for reflecting what investors think about banks (Cheng et al., 2010). Compared to model (1),
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model (3) includes additional variables TARP, P_equity and TARP*P_equity. TARP is a
proxy describing whether a bank received funding from the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
If a bank receives funding from TARP, the variable TARP is equal to 1; otherwise it is 0. In
addition, in order to examine the impact of TARP on total equity compensation, this model
does not separate P_equity into options and restricted shares. Moreover, the variable
TARP*P_equity is incorporated into the regression. The sign of this variable reflects whether
TARP effectively regulates equity-based compensation to reduce banks’ risk.
Furthermore, we also estimate time to maturity of options. Option value is divided into two
groups, short-term value and long-term value. The model used in this analysis is:
Risk Measure t =   0 +   1 P_bonus t-1 +   2 P_Soption t-1 +	  3 P_Loption t-1
+  4 P_RS t-1 +   5 CEO tenuret +   6 MBt +   7 ROA t-1
+  8 Asset t +  9 Ownership t +	  10 Year +   t (4)
In this model, variable P_Soption is the weight of options with short time to maturity in total
compensation, and variable P_Loption is for options with long time to maturity. Bhagat and
Romano (2009) indicate that the vesting period of options is expected to be more than three
or four years that helps to reduce CEO incentives to increase banks’ risk taking. Therefore,
we choose two years as a classification criterion to determine whether options are short-
term. Additionally, four years and six years are used as two further classification criteria by
which to divide options into two groups.
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on risk, compensation structure, CEO characteristics
and firm performance in our sample.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
During the period 2002-2008 (Table 1, Part A), the value of option granted to CEOs
occupied the biggest proportion of total compensation, accounting for 70%. Restricted
shares represent about 14% of total compensation, while the bonus contributes to 5.7%. On
the contrary, in the period 2009-2013 (Table 1, Part B), the proportion of bonuses declined
to 2.4% in mean value, while the value of restricted shares increased to 28% in mean value.
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This change reflects the fact that the regulators required banks to reduce bonuses granted to
CEOs, because bonuses are regarded to be the cause of financial crisis. As for restricted
shares, which are regarded as a vehicle for reducing excessive risk-taking by banks, banks
enhanced their application after the financial crisis.
Comparing the risks between the period 2009-2013 and 2002-2008, total risk increases from
2.4% to 3.8% as a result of increases in both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. The
increase in systematic risk means banks have become more sensitive to stock market
movement. The rise in idiosyncratic risk indicates that on average executives have to bear
more risks than in the pre-crisis period. The mean of capital ratio is 8.8% during 2002-2008,
and became more than 9.9% during 2009-2013. This increase indicates that compared with
previous years, banks adopted more equity to finance their operating activities. This would
help to reduce the default risk and finance cost. This is largely consistent with the objectives
of TARP, which is to stimulate banks’ lending activities and promoting financial health
(Farruggio et al., 2013). During the period 2002-2008, the mean of MB ratio is t 1.99, but
declines shapely to 1.16 for the period of 2009-2013. This is consistent with the fact that
external investors do not have enough confidence in banks’ future development during the
financial crisis.
4.2 Relationship between CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking
We apply the Hausman tests to determine whether the random effects or fixed effects
model is more appropriate. Table 2 represents regression results for nine models in which
we study the impact of different components of CEO compensation on the three risk
measures.
4.2.1 Impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk-taking in the 2002-2008 period
During the period 2002-2008 (Table 2, Part A), the estimated coefficient of P_bonus is
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the CEOs’ bonus reduces the banks’
total risk. This is inconsistent with H1 that a bonus provides an incentive to CEOs to take on
more risks. In respect of the influence of CEO bonus on systematic risk and idiosyncratic
risk separately, it is found that the coefficients are negative and statistically significant at
10% and 1% levels, respectively. Therefore, significant negative coefficient of total risk is
the result of systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. While only the systematic risk is likely to
influence the banks’ value, the reduction in idiosyncratic risk would cause CEOs to become
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less risk-averse. This is the intention of shareholders, as it aligns the interests of the latter
with those of the CEO.
However, the results in Table 2, Part A, indicate that although bonuses granted to CEO help
to reduce idiosyncratic risk that CEOs are exposed to, it may also cause a reduction in
systematic risk. This reduction in systematic risk may be the result of hedging policies
(Chan, 2005). As a result, more bonuses granted to CEOs appear to decrease banks’ total
risk. Therefore, the assertion that the financial crisis was caused by the bonuses granted
cannot be substantiated. Even though bonuses are given by the shareholders to executives
to provide them with an incentive to accept risky projects with positive NPV, too generous
bonuses will cause excessive risks. However, our results indicate that CEOs with bonus
awards will reduce banks’ risk exposure to the market while at the same time reducing
idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, results of the relation between restricted shares granted,
P_RS, and risk taking (although showing a negative sign) are not statistically significant
during the 2002-2008 period. Therefore, it is concluded that there is no evidence to support
H2 that restricted shares granted to CEOs will decrease banks’ risk-taking.
With regard to P_option, the percentage of options granted to total compensation, the
coefficient of idiosyncratic risk is marginally significant, while the coefficients of total risk
and systematic risk are insignificant. These results provide no evidence to support either
the risk-aversion or the risk-taking hypothesis in the 2002-2008 period. Among the control
variables during 2002-2008 period, capital_ratio serves as a measure of financial leverage.
Banks with a higher capital ratio have a lower default risk as well as a lower cost of debt.
Consequently, it is predicted that there is a negative relation between capital ratio and
bank’s risk. The negative and significant coefficient on capital ratio at the 1% level in all
models is supportive of this argument. Similarly, large size banks have more opportunities
to diversity their products and operations, and therefore will reduce the risk of the firm.
Our results support this argument with negative and significant coefficient in all models,
except the model for bonus on systematic risk.
Banks with a high MB ratio generate value from future investments rather than current
operations. Our results indicate negative and statistically significant coefficients for MB in
all models. The reason why firms have a higher market value is because investors believe
that they will have a good performance in the future. Compared with firms having lower
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market value, such firms are believed to be less risky. Therefore, it is argued that this is
likely to be the reason for the negative coefficient.
4.2.2 Impact of CEO compensation on banks’ risk-taking in the 2009-2013 period
After the recent 2007-2008 financial crisis, it is generally argued that the bonus is the root
cause of excessive risk-taking by banks and other financial institutions, resulting in the
global financial crisis. Consequently, TARP was introduced to provide capital to the
financial sector when the requirements on compensation are complied with, and prohibits
participants from granting cash bonuses to executives (Murphy, 2009). This change in
regulation had an impact on the compensation structure and many firms switched to other
forms of compensation. Table 2, Part B presents results for the period 2009-2013. The
coefficients of the proportion of bonus to total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk
are not statistically significant. This indicates that after the compensation structure
adjustment as a result of financial crisis, there is no evidence to support the relationship
between bonuses granted to CEOs and banks’ risk.
With regard to the relationship between restricted shares awarded to CEOs and banks’ risk,
we found that the proportion of restricted shares to total compensation is negatively related
to total risk and idiosyncratic risk in the 2009-2013 period at the 1% level. It means more
restricted shares help to diversify CEO’s portfolios and reduce the idiosyncratic risk they
have to bear. However, restricted shares are granted when some specific criteria are met,
such as the length of tenure. In addition, like other shares, there is no downside limit for
restricted shares due to stock market movements. Consequently, it is likely that CEOs with
more restricted shares prefer to refuse risky projects even with positive NPV. Therefore, it
is concluded that restricted shares granted to CEOs appear to decrease the total risk and
idiosyncratic risk of banks (see e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985).
The empirical results in Table 2, Part B indicate that the options granted to a CEO decrease
banks’ total risk and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition,
the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk is also negative and statistically significant at the 1%
level. As discussed earlier, the undiversified CEO bears extra idiosyncratic risk as
compared to shareholders, and, therefore, the value of an option to them is not equal to the
cost calculated by shareholders. Even though options granted reduce the idiosyncratic risk
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that a CEO bears, it does not reduce such risk to zero. In addition, CEOs discount the value
of options and the discount is positively associated with their degree of risk aversion.
Furthermore, it is argued that the intended incentive of options to take on risk is only
feasible when used at a moderate level, beyond which granting more options reduces the
incentive effects (see Tian, 2004). However, it is not clear whether the option currently
granted is within or beyond such criteria. Therefore, these results support the risk-aversion
hypothesis. It is concluded that options granted to CEOs do not provide them with an
incentive to take on high risk projects, and these options result in a decrease in banks’ risk.
Among the control variables, tenure is positively associated with banks’ risk and the
coefficient is statistically significant. CEO with longer tenure would be more familiar with
the firm’s operating activities and business environment. Therefore, a CEO with a longer
tenure is confident to deal with risk and consequently prefers to accept projects with a
positive net present value, regardless of their risk (see Vafeas 2003). Similarly, our results
indicate that the coefficients of capital_ratio for the post-financial crisis period are
negative and statistically significant in all models, suggesting that the larger the equity
capital, the lower the banks’ risk (see Chen et al., 2006).
Dummy variables for 2009 through 2012 were positive and statistically significant
indicating that risk after controlling for the effects of compensation structure and the other
exogenous variables was higher during these years. Overall, both the descriptive statistics
and empirical results suggest limited evidence to support the assertion that compensation
structure is the cause of excessive risk in the banking sector.
4.2.3 Analysis of firms with low vs. high market-to-book ratio
Ryan and Wiggins (2001) provide evidence that firms with more growth opportunities
generate value from future investments rather than the existing assets. They also indicate
that as these firms derive a large portion of their value from assets not yet in place,
controlling the agency problem through the monitoring mechanism is not easy. They argue
that firms with a high market-to-book ratio prefer to adopt equity-based incentives to align
the interests of CEOs to shareholders’. As a consequence, we rank firms based on market-
to-book ratio, and divide the full sample into two subsamples – one including firms with a
low MB ratio, and another comprising firms with a high MB ratio. We test the relation
between total risk and the executive compensation structure of these two groups separately
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using the firm fixed effect model or random effect model as applicable, based on the
Hausman test.
The regression results are displayed in Table 3. It is evident from Table 3, Part A, that
during the 2002-2008 period, bonuses granted to CEOs are statistically significant and
negatively related to banks’ risk-taking for the low MB ratio subsample. However, we
observe that the relation is statistically insignificant in the case of banks with a high MB
ratio. As a result, more bonuses given to CEOs appear to reduce banks’ risk in low MB
ratio sub-sample during 2002-2008.
Results for the period 2009-2013 are presented in Table 3, Part B. It seems that as a result
of compensation reforms under the regulation, both restricted shares and options are
negatively related to risk for firms with fewer investment opportunities. Interestingly for
the high MB ratio group, the coefficients are found to be statistically insignificant. We
submit the following reasons. As discussed earlier, the TARP program restricts participants
from granting cash bonuses to CEOs after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and the influence
of bonuses on banks’ risk is insignificant in the main regression during the 2009-2013
period. However, after considering investment opportunities, the bonus is positively related
to risk for the low MB firms sub-sample. For firms in the higher MB sub-sample, the
relation remains insignificant. Therefore, in general, for the period 2009-2013, it is still
concluded that investment opportunities do influence the relation between compensation
structure and bank risk taking.11
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
4.2.4 Effectiveness of TARP in influencing banks’ risk
Results from estimating model (3) show that TARP generates a statistically significant
and positive impact on risk taking by banks, which is against the intended objective of the
US government’s initiative that TARP would result in reducing banks’ excessive risk
11 Given that years 2007-2008 are considered as the peak of the financial crisis, observations from these two
years are likely to be the noise of our test. Consequently, as a check of the robustness of our results, we
exclude the CEO- year observations for years 2007 and 2008. For the after financial crisis period, we also
exclude the year 2009 for a similar reason. A large number of banks went bankrupt in that year, and it is
believed that the market is in the way of recovering. Excluding that year helps to mitigate the influence of
market on bank’s return volatility. The results (unreported to conserve space) are largely consistent with the
empirical results from our main regression.
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taking (see Table 4). Though this result does not support the hypothesis in this study, it is
consistent with the findings of Cadman et al. (2012). As banks receiving funding from
TARP will be strictly monitored by government, monitoring incentives of external
investors may reduce accordingly, which may encourage executives to engage in more
risk-taking behaviors, resulting in increasing banks’ total risk.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Furthermore, column (1) in Table 4 also shows that the coefficients of P_option, and
P_RS are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The result in Table
4 indicates that options granted to CEOs help to reduce banks’ risk taking during 2009-
2013. This result may be attributed to internal governance and risk management
recommendations prescribed by the authorities (e.g., Basel Committee). After the
financial crisis, banks are required to reduce excessive risk taking through changing
executive compensation structure (Cadman et al., 2012), and by controlling for options
granted to CEOs. Both the redesign of the expiration date or exercise price can alter the
structure of options granted, which may help to decrease banks’ risk taking. As for
restricted shares, the result illustrates that rewarding restricted shares to CEOs after the
financial crisis reduces total risk. Our finding is similar to that of Bührer (2010), which
suggests restricted stock can align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders.
In respect of control variables, the coefficients of both ROA and market-to-book ratio are
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. For ROA, it is reasonable to observe
such a negative sign, because good accounting performance is expected to be related to
low risk taking by banks. For the market-to-book ratio, the negative coefficient may be
explained by the fact that better investment opportunities will help reduce total risk.
Column (2) and column (3) show the results to the question of whether TARP is effective
in regulating CEO equity-based compensation. To examine the impact of TARP on the
total of the equity-based compensation package, this analysis does not separate the impact
into its components. Column (2) illustrates that equity-based compensation statistically
significantly reduces risk-taking by banks. In addition, receiving funding from TARP
appears to increase banks’ risk taking. Both of these findings are consistent with those
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obtained from column (1). As for column (3), the variable, TARP*P_equity, is included to
test the impact of TARP on equity-based compensation rewards to CEOs. For P_equity
and TARP, the coefficients are statistically significant and the signs are the same as those
in column (2). As for the interaction variable TARP*P_equity, the coefficient is not
statistically significant. However, this variable has the expected negative sign indicating
that TARP may be effective in promoting equity-based compensation to reduce risk taking
by banks, though the bailout program as a whole seems to increase the total risk of banks.
Additionally, columns (2) and (3) show that the coefficients of market-to-book ratio and
ROA are statistically significant, which is consistent with the results presented in column
(1).
4.2.5 The impact of time to maturity of options on banks’ risk-taking
Finally, Table (5) presents the results for the estimation model (4), examining whether
time to maturity of options granted to CEOs affects banks’ risk-taking.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
In Table 5, Column (1) shows the results when options are divided into two categories:
options with time to maturity of less than two years and options with time to maturity of
greater than two years. Column (2) and column (3) show the regression results when four
years and six years are used as classification standards respectively. Firstly, when using
two years as the classification rule, the coefficient of variable P_op>2y is statistically
significant, but the coefficient of P_op<2y is not. This result suggests that options with
time to maturity of more than two years significantly reduce risk-taking by banks, which
is similar to the view of Bolton et al. (2006), although their paper focuses on the vesting
period of options. This result may be explained by the fact that an extended time to
maturity can better help to align CEOs’ interests with those of shareholders.
Furthermore, when using four years as the classification rule, only options with a time to
maturity of more than four years are statistically significant and negative, indicating that
they decrease a bank’s risk levels. However, when six years is used to classify options,
both options with time to maturity of less than or greater than six years reduce risk-taking
by banks. This finding suggests that six years is long enough to reduce the ‘risk effect’ of
options. In sum, our analysis does not present evidence supporting the idea that options
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with a time to maturity of less than four years decrease a bank’s total risk, and suggest
that regulators and banks should pay attention to this form of option and regulate it
accordingly.
5. Conclusion
This study investigates the effects of the CEO compensation structure on banks’ risk-
taking during both pre and post financial crisis periods. We begin our analysis with
examining components of CEO compensation with different market-based measures of
risk including, total risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. Three key findings
emerge from our analyses. Firstly, in the period 2002-2008, bonuses awarded to CEOs
reduced banks’ risk taking, measured by total risk and systematic risk, as well as
idiosyncratic risk. Our study provides no evidence to support the argument that the bonus
was the cause of the financial crisis.
Secondly, in the period 2009-2013, both the restricted shares and the options granted to
CEOs appeared to decrease banks’ risk taking. The intention of compensation reforms
introduced by the US government was to link CEO pay to long-term performance, in
order to align the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders. The results from our study
indicate that shares and options granted will not lead to excessive risk. However, it
remains unclear whether CEOs will refuse the high-risk/ high-return projects, which are
consistent with the interests of risk-neutral shareholders. Our robustness tests based on
the sub-samples confirm the results obtained from our main sample results.
Thirdly, this study finds no evidence to support the view that TARP is effective in
regulating equity-based compensation. However, our subsequent findings provide strong
evidence to support our hypothesis that options with a longer time to maturity reduce a
bank’s risk-taking, while options with a shorter time to maturity increase risk-taking by
banks. Our findings complement recent literature in the field examining the issue of
whether executive compensation structure led to banks’ excessive risk taking before the
financial crisis. Additionally, our research provides useful evidence on the effectiveness
of TARP in regulating compensation and the impact of time to maturity of options on risk
taking of banks. These results could be of interest to regulators who intend to monitor the
banking system to help avoid the occurrence of another financial crisis. In addition, our
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findings have practical implications for a number of stakeholders, such as managers,
shareholders and policy makers.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Table 1: Part A
Period (2002-2008) Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
Total risk 0.024 0.016 0.019 0.006 0.112
Systematic risk 1.223 1.185 0.408 0.395 2.619
Idiosyncratic risk 0.019 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.101
P_bonus 0.057 0.040 0.063 0.000 0.396
P_RS 0.138 0.040 0.197 0.000 0.958
P_option 0.702 0.754 0.226 0.000 1.000
Tenure 8.223 7.000 5.888 1.000 29.000
Capital_ratio 0.088 0.089 0.024 0.019 0.185
MB 1.990 1.971 0.893 0.000 5.145
LnTA 10.116 9.588 1.682 7.625 14.593
Table 1: Part B
Period (2009-2013) Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
Total risk 0.038 0.023 0.018 0.008 0.110
Systematic risk 1.481 1.406 0.419 0.686 3.258
Idiosyncratic risk 0.021 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.102
P_bonus 0.024 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.473
P_RS 0.279 0.272 0.239 0.000 0.929
P_option 0.422 0.433 0.068 0.000 0.992
Tenure 8.554 6.000 7.387 1.000 34.000
Capital_ratio 0.099 0.099 0.030 -0.111 0.186
MB 1.161 1.126 0.565 -0.725 3.337
LnTA 9.996 9.548 1.701 7.613 14.698
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics. P_bonus, P_RS, P_option are the weights of
bonus, restricted shares, and options in total compensation. The option value is calculated
using the Black-Scholes model. Tenure is the number of years that the CEO had spent in
office. Capital_ratio is the equity-to-asset ratio, which is equal to the book value of equity
divided by total asset, and it is the proxy of financial leverage. MB is the market-to-book ratio,
representing the investment opportunity. LnTA is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the
bank, and it is as the measure of bank size.
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Table 2: Part A
Relation between alternative risk measures and the CEO compensation structure for the period 2002-2008
Total Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
2002-2008
P_bonus -0.816*** -0.661* -0.931***
(-3.09) (-1.96) (-3.49)
P_RS -0.069 -0.059 -0.066
(-0.92) (-0.62) (-0.83)
P_option -0.091 -0.008 0.126
(-1.38) (-0.09) (1.84)*
Tenure -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.71) (-1.24) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-0.43) (-0.97) (-1.02)
Capital_ratio -3.74*** -3.571*** -3.660*** -4.406*** -3.801*** -3.763*** -3.359*** 3.410*** -3.553***
(-3.54) (-5.79) (-5.86) (-3.27) (-4.96) (-4.86) (-3.15) (-5.21) (-5.38)
MB -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.069** -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.138*** -0.131*** -0.137***
(-3.46) (-5.77) (-5.86) (-1.65) (-3.75) (-3.63) (-4.17) (-6.17) (-6.39)
Ownership -0.012 -0.026 -0.033 0.0518 -0.039 -0.036 -0.049 -0.026 -0.038
(-0.20) (-0.71) (-0.87) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-0.77) (-0.82) (-0.67) (-0.96)
LnTA -0.142** -0.055*** -0.058*** -0.055 -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.179*** -0.062*** -0.065***
(-2.07) (-5.11) (-5.46) (-0.63) (-3.87) (-4.07) (-2.58) (-5.31) (-5.67)
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 287
R
2 0.858 0.903 0.903 0.401 0.447 0.446 0.813 0.886 0.886
32
Table 2: Part B
Relation between alternative risk measures and the CEO compensation structure for the period 2009-2013
Total Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
2009-2013
P_bonus 0.289 0.232 0.246
(0.154) (0.209) (0.318)
P_RS -0.236*** -0.038 -0.305***
(0.001) (0.562) (0.001)
P_option -0.178*** -0.051 -0.237***
(0.006) (0.391) (0.002)
Tenure 0.006** 0.005 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.006 0.010***
(0.032) (0.127) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.106) (0.006)
Capital_ratio -4.477*** -4.665*** -4.175*** -1.886*** -1.877*** -1.767*** -5.152*** -5.422*** -4.780***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MB -0.042 -0.034 -0.045 -5.2E-05 0.0037 0.001 -0.049 -0.041 -0.055
(0.272) (0.364) (0.231) (0.989) (0.913) (0.976) (0.290) (0.369) (0.219)
Ownership -0.042 -0.026 -0.021 -0.024 -0.021 -0.018 -0.083 -0.063 -0.057
(0.369) (0.562) (0.646) (0.556) (0.610) (0.668) (0.137) (0.243) (0.304)
LnTA -0.082 -0.085 -0.041 0.061 0.067 0.078 -0.088 -0.097 -0.039
(0.290) (0.259) (0.589) (0.379) (0.333) (0.278) (0.348) (0.290) (0.675)
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389
R2 0.735 0.729 0.776 0.282 0.271 0.270 0.665 0.660 0.714
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Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for the nine models. P_bonus, P_RS, and P_option are the weights of bonus, restricted share, and
options in total CEO compensation. The option value is calculated using the Black- Scholes model. Tenure is the number of years that the CEO had spent in office. Capital_Ratio
is the equity-to-asset ratio, which is equal to the book value of equity divided by total asset, and it is the proxy of financial leverage. MB is the market-to-book ratio, representing
the investment opportunity. Ownership is the common shared owned by the CEO as a percentage of total shares outstanding; it is equal to 1 if the percentage is equal or more
than 1%, 0 otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank, and it is as the measure of bank size. Yearly dummies are coded as 1 or 0 for each year from
2002 to 2013.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Part A
Regression results after considering the moderator for the period 2002-2008
Total risk Total risk
2002-2008 (Low MB) 2002-2008 (High MB)
P_bonus -1.098*** P_bonus -0.092
(0.009) (0.719)
P_RS -0.148 P_shares 0.119
(0.111) (0.328)
P_option 0.181 P_option -0.136
(0.216) (0.185)
Tenure -0.013 -0.001 -0.006 Tenure -0.006* -0.006* -0.006*
(0.140) (0.697) (0.466) (0.068) (0.075) (0.065)
Capital_ratio -6.503*** -3.252*** -7.151*** Capital_ratio -1.406 -1.476 -1.367
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.219) (0.251)
MB -0.504*** -0.256*** -0.565*** MB -0.005 -0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.881) (0.913) (0.960)
Ownership -0.171* -0.042 -0.177* Ownership 0.001 0.0111 0.021
(0.090) (0.402) (0.090) (0.992) (0.803) (0.639)
LnTA -0.158 -0.056*** -0.131 LnTA -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.056***
(0.135) (0.000) (0.239) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 144 144 144 143 143 143
    0.867 0.924 0.857 0.834 0.837 0.839
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Table 3: Part B
Regression results after considering the moderator for the period of 2009-2013
Total risk Total risk
2009-2013 (Low MB) 2009-2013 (High MB)
P_bonus 0.786** LnP_bonus -0.022
(0.011) (0.994)
P_RS -0.216** P_RS -0.145
(0.021) (0.148)
P_option -0.248*** P_option -0.118
(0.001) (0.202)
Tenure 0.0037 0.0014 0.004 Tenure 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.448) (0.632) (0.151) (0.140) (0.148) (0.122)
Capital_ratio -5.821*** -5.282*** -5.009*** Capital_ratio -4.537*** -4.767*** -4.181***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MB -0.123 -0.183*** -0.182*** MB 0.0166 0.015 0.0191
(0.178) (0.004) (0.003) (0.749) (0.772) (0.712)
Ownership -0.178** -0.156*** -0.129*** Ownership -0.009 -0.019 -0.015
(0.012) (0.002) (0.010) (0.913) (0.795) (0.842)
LnTA -0.405*** -0.037*** -0.021 LnTA 0.1795 0.166 0.1740
(0.005) (0.003) (0.113) (0.125) (0.145) (0.127)
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Obs. 194 194 194 195 195 195
    0.437 0.863 0.867 0.503 0.526 0.536
Notes: This table shows the parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for the nine P_bonus, P_RS, and P_option models representing the weights of bonus, restricted
share, and options in total CEO compensation. The option value is calculated using the Black- Scholes model. Tenure is the number of years that the CEO had spent in office.
Capital_Ratio is the equity-to-asset ratio, which is equal to the book value of equity divided by total asset, and it is the proxy of financial leverage. MB is the market-to-book
ratio, representing the investment opportunity. Ownership is the common shared owned by the CEO as a percentage of total shares outstanding; it is equal to 1 if the
percentage is equal or more than 1%, 0 otherwise. LnTA is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank, and it is as the measure of bank size. Yearly dummies are
coded as 1 or 0 for each year from 2002 to 2013.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4
Effectiveness of TARP in regulating CEO compensation and reducing banks’ risk 2008-2013
(1) (2) (3)
P_bonus -0.171 -0.172 -0.179
(0.229) (0.225) (0.200)
P_option -0.206***
(0.002)
P_RS -0.187**
(0.014)
P_equity -0.198*** -0.132*
(0.003) (0.091)
TARP 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.140*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.071)
TARP*P_equity -0.090
(0.370)
Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.413) (0.383) (0.357)
MB -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA -5.812*** -5.812*** -5.731***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnTA 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.475) (0.511) (0.479)
Ownership -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.977) (0.963) (0.824)
_cons 1.040*** 1.044*** 1.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Obs. 345 345 345
R2 0.769 0.768 0.770
Notes: This table presents parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for model(s) testing whether TARP is
effective in regulating CEO equity-based compensation and reducing banks total risk-taking from 2008 to 2013.
The dependent variable is volatility of stock return. P_bonus is the weight of bonus in CEO’s total compensation,
P_equity represents the weight of equity compensation in CEO’s total compensation. Tenure is the number of years
that the CEO had spent in office. MB is the market-to-book ratio, representing the investment opportunity. ROA is
return on assets to controls for firm performance. LnTA is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank, and it
is as the measure of bank size. Ownership is the common shared owned by the CEO as a percentage of total shares
outstanding; it is equal to 1 if the percentage is equal or more than 1%, 0 otherwise. TARP is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a bank receives funding from TARP, and 0 otherwise. We also control for year effect using year dummy
variables.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Impact of time to maturity of options on risk-taking by banks 2008-2013
(1) (2) (3)
P_bonus -0.172 -0.168 -0.174
(0.282) (0.291) (0.278)
P_RS -0.163** -0.157** -0.157*
(0.041) (0.050) (0.051)
lnP_op<2y -0.262
(0.105)
P_op>2y -0.203***
(0.006)
P_op<4y -0.169
(0.124)
P_op>4y -0.213***
(0.003)
P_op<6y -0.181*
(0.058)
P_op>6y -0.223***
(0.003)
Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.511) (0.438) (0.433)
MB -0.095*** -0.096*** -0.095***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA -6.183*** -6.351*** -6.313***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnTA 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.192) (0.202) (0.186)
ownership -0.011 -0.014 -0.014
(0.645) (0.569) (0.577)
_cons 1.070*** 1.077*** 1.072***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Obs. 345 345 345
R2 0.758 0.759 0.759
Notes: This table presents parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses) for model(s) testing whether
time to maturity of options granted to CEOs affects banks risk-taking. The dependent variable is volatility
of stock return. P_bonus is the weight of bonus in CEO’s total compensation, P_Soption is the weight
of options with short time to maturity in total compensation, and variable P_Loption is for options with long
time to maturity, and P_RS are restricted shares owned by CEOs. Options are divided into two groups, and
two years, four years and six years are used as standards (e.g., P_op<4y and P_op>4y). Tenure is the
number of years that the CEO had spent in office. MB is the market-to-book ratio, representing the
investment opportunity. ROA is return on assets to controls for firm performance. LnTA is the natural
logarithm of the total assets of the bank, and it is as the measure of bank size. Ownership is the common
shared owned by the CEO as a percentage of total shares outstanding; it is equal to 1 if the percentage is
equal or more than 1%, 0 otherwise. We also control for year effect using year dummy variables.
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
